authorized two other LOST that are used as counties' general revenues, which may also affect school capital funding, albeit indirectly.
Earmarking sales tax revenue for education is a recent development, although local sales taxes have a long history in the U.S. Georgia is one of the few states to earmark LOST for education, specifically for the construction of school facilities and retirement of debt (Rubenstein and Freeman, 2003) . School districts in South Carolina also were authorized to impose LOST for specific education capital improvement, although no district there has adopted the tax. Experiences from other states have raised concerns that the adoption of LOST may increase inequality in school finance, since the unevenly distributed sales tax proceeds may exacerbate existing inequality in property tax revenues that often serve as the primary local source for school districts. The empirical results, however, have been mixed (Rubenstein and Freeman, 2003; Zhao and Hou, 2008) .
Using a data set of one hundred counties from 2004 to 2006, this study examines whether the LOST aggravate or alleviate inequality in public school capital revenue in NC. We ask three research questions: (1) How are public school capital revenues and the LOST proceeds distributed across counties in NC? (2) How did various revenue sources, in particular the LOST proceeds, contribute to the dispersion of public school capital revenue in recent years? (3) How would the equity impact change if the LOST proceeds are earmarked at different levels or allocated in different ways? The results of the study will shed light on the policy design and fiscal impacts of using LOST for financing public schools, which has been more widely adopted or considered in some states in recent years.
$! !
This paper is divided into six sections. Following the introduction, the second section describes how public school capital outlays are funded by state and local revenues in NC. The third section briefly reviews literature on school facilities funding in the U.S. and fiscal effects of LOST. The fourth section discusses research questions, data, and research methodology. The fifth section analyzes the disparities in funding for public school facilities, and examines the equity impact of LOST on public school capital revenues, both in the current situation and in alternative scenarios of LOST earmarking and allocation. The final section concludes and discusses directions for future research.
!

SCHOOL FACILITIES FUNDING IN NORTH CAROLINA
School districts in NC, including one hundred county units and fifteen city units, are fiscally dependent on the counties and the state government (Mesibov and Johansen, 2007) . Since the 1930s, NC has established a basic structure of school finance with a division of responsibility between state and county. The state is mainly responsible for current expenses necessary to maintain the minimum nine-month term, while counties are mainly responsible for financing construction and maintenance of school facilities.
However, over time, the state has frequently supplemented funds for school construction, and counties have also provided funds to supplement state funding for school current expenditures (Mesibov and Johansen, 2007) .
Local funds for school capital outlays may come from three sources (G.S. 115C-42b(f)). First, through the regular budget process, counties may appropriate part of their general revenues for school capital projects. Second, voters within a school unit may approve by referendum a levy of supplemental property tax for school expenditures.
%! !
Finally, counties may raise money for school construction through by issuing GO bonds (Lawrence and Vogt, 2007) . Over the years, the state has offered direct and indirect assistance for school construction. One kind of state assistance has been the authorization of LOST. As indicated in Table 1 , in 1983, the state legislature authorized counties to levy an additional one-half-cent LOST (Article 40 tax), with the proceeds partially earmarked for school capital outlay or retirement of existing school indebtedness. In the first five fiscal years after the tax was imposed, the counties were required to use 40 percent of the proceeds for school capital outlay or retirement of indebtedness related to capital outlays; in the next twenty-three fiscal years, they were to use 30 percent for those purposes. In 1986, the state legislature authorized another half-cent LOST (Article 42 tax). In the first twenty-five years of the tax, counties were required to use 60 percent of the proceeds for public school capital outlay or to repay school debt incurred during the five years before the tax became effective. The two LOST are collected by the state together with state sales tax. After subtracting administrative costs, the proceeds are placed in a statewide &! ! pool and allocated among the one hundred counties on a per capita basis. With these features, the two local sales taxes are often viewed as a form of state revenue sharing because, in fact, the state is collecting a traditional state revenue source, i.e. retail sales tax, and giving it to local units for school facilities (Mesibov and Johansen, 2007) .
Another type of state assistance for school construction has been state aid programs. In 1987, NC increased its corporate income tax from 6 to 7 percent and established the Public School Building Capital Fund to provide additional state monies for school construction.
iii Allocated according to school enrollments, the Public School
Building Capital Fund provides aid to all school districts for school building capital needs or school technology needs (SBE, 2005) . Funds for capital projects must be matched by $1 of local funds for each $3 of state funds; earmarked local sales tax revenues can be used as local matching funds. In 1996, the state enacted the Public School Building Bond Act, which authorized the issuance of up to $1.8 billion in state GO bonds for school capital outlay purposes. For this program, 40 percent of the aid is allocated based on the unit's average daily membership (ADM), 35 percent on its ability-to-pay, and 25 percent on the unit's growth. These funds have local matching requirements except the part allocated based on the ability-to-pay (SBE, 2005) .
From 1984 to 1993, the two earmarked LOST and the two state aid funds provided local units nearly $1.5 billion in additional funds for school construction.
However, the amount represented only about half of the $3 billion spent on school construction during this period. Counties provided the other half through local revenue sources and debt financing. In recent years, debt financing has become increasingly popular and accounted for a larger share of total capital revenue, partly because one effective way for a county to take advantage of state aid is to leverage it by issuing bonds, which are then paid back through earmarked sales tax revenues (Mesibov and Johansen, 2007 (Lawrence and Millonzi, 2007) . Although these LOST are used as counties' general revenues, they may have indirect effects on school capital funding, because county general support is an important source of school capital outlays in NC.
PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Recent years have seen a growing interest in the way state and local governments finance their school infrastructure. Besides general concerns over the level of spending on school facilities, there has also been a concern about the distribution of the capital spending (and facility condition) across school districts (Brunner and Rueben, 2001 ).
The constitutionality of school finance systems has been increasingly challenged in many (! ! states because of inequities in school facilities across school districts (Brunner and Rueben, 2001; Gamkhar and Koerner, 2002; Plummer, 2006) . In NC, school districts have effectively used evidence of deficient school facilities as part-and-parcel of a comprehensive attack on the state's school finance scheme (Sciarra, Bell and Kenyon, 2006 Burton (1999) finds that disparities exist between school facilities where poor and non-poor are educated in NC.
The condition of school facilities worsens as the share of low-income students increases. show that EDA has not provided significant property tax relief, as intended, for districts receiving its funds, and IFA has not been effective in achieving greater capital outlay equity across districts at different wealth levels.
There are few journal articles related to LOST and fiscal disparity. Rubenstein and Freeman (2003) report that property tax has remained the dominant revenue source for school funding over the years. They conclude that the differences in sales tax bases across school districts in Georgia may have exacerbated the existing fiscal inequities among school districts, which mainly relies on local property tax as the primary revenue source. The main reason for this phenomenon is that sales tax base tends to concentrate in heavily populated urban and suburban areas, and that the state does little in its funding formulas to equalize differences in sales tax capacity or property tax wealth. Later, Zhao and Hou (2008) 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY
The objective of this study is to examine whether the adoption and restricted use of the two earmarked LOST exacerbate or alleviate the inequality in public school capital revenue in NC. Other than the two LOST, NC school districts also rely heavily on local property tax levies and state aid programs for capital outlays. Local property tax levies are commonly assumed to be the major factor of education fiscal disparity (Rubenstein and Freeman, 2003) , while the two state aid programs are expected to have some equalizing effects. The possible effects of LOST on education finance equity hinge not
(1) whether the proceeds are unevenly distributed, and (2) how the distribution of LOST proceeds relate to the distribution of other revenues (Zhao and Hou, 2008) .
Moreover, the NC case has two additional features adding to the complexity of LOST's equalizing effect. First, because restricted proceeds from Article 40 and 42 taxes are placed in a statewide pool and then allocated on a per capita basis instead of a pointof-sale basis, they may have equalizing effects on school finance to the extent that the population size positively correlates with total pupil numbers. Second, the unrestricted portion of LOST proceeds-including un-earmarked parts of Article 40 and 42 taxes, and all of Article 39 and 44 taxes-are added to county general funds before partial allocation for education including school capital expenditures. As additional revenue sources, these LOST proceeds will change the distribution of county fiscal capacity and
then indirectly affect distribution of school capital outlays. Consequently, it would be interesting to separate the equalization effects of restricted and unrestricted portions of LOST proceeds as they interplay with other revenue sources in the overall dispersion of school capital outlays. Moreover, the earmarked ratio of LOST for school capital outlays has changed over time, and the proceeds may be allocated in different ways (for instance, per pupil instead of per capita). We will also examine the equity effect for alternative scenarios of LOST earmarking and allocation, which bear direct implications for policy designs about LOST.
As mentioned above, the key research questions include (1) descriptive statistics to analyze LOST and total public school capital revenues among counties in NC. To answer the second and third questions, we will measure fiscal inequalities with the Gini index (Gini, 1912) , ix and then we employ the standard decomposition of the Gini coefficient to examine the contribution of multiple revenue sources-in particular, earmarked and unrestricted LOST proceeds-to the dispersion of total school capital revenue. With this method, we can decompose the Gini index of a total revenue as multiple pseudo-Gini indices that account for each single revenue source, calculate the absolute and relative contribution of each revenue source to the total
revenue inequality (Fei, Ranis, and Kuo, 1978) , and then estimate the marginal effect of each revenue source on the inequality of total revenue (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985) . For technical notes of the standard Gini decomposition, see the Appendix.
!
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The Distribution of LOST and Other Capital Revenues suggests that counties with higher per pupil total capital revenue tend to rely more on GO bonds to finance school capital spending. The distribution of debt proceeds is worth our special attention, since it amounts to around 40 percent of the total school capital revenue. In Table 3 we also present "net debt proceeds" per pupil calculated by subtracting debt service payments from the proceeds of newly issued debt. The negative amount of "net debt proceeds" for counties in the first two quartiles indicates that these counties had higher debt service payments than the amount of debt newly issued. This might happen due to a combined reason that
(1) these counties have exhausted their debt capacity with high level of outstanding debt, and (2) they may be facing higher borrowing costs because of lower levels of fiscal capacity. The significantly higher amounts of both newly issued debt and net debt in
counties of the top quartile appear to be the major factor driving the difference in school capital revenues between these counties and the others in the state.
xiii
In terms of fiscal capacity, counties with higher per pupil school capital revenues appear to have higher per pupil property tax base and total LOST revenue. Regarding student characteristics, higher capital-spending schools have much larger average enrollment and higher enrollment growth, lower shares of children aged 5-17 in families in poverty, xiv and lower property tax rates. These results suggest that revenue for public school capital outlays is positively associated with the fiscal capacity of counties.
Districts with a higher share of disadvantaged students (including African American and minority students) and children in families in poverty, have less revenue available for their public school infrastructure. Table 4 shows the capital revenue sources by quartiles of per pupil total LOST proceeds that were received by NC counties. First, per pupil total LOST proceeds have a strong positive correlation with per pupil property tax base and county general support, but they are negatively related to property tax rates, proportions of African American and minority students, and children in families in poverty. This indicates that the adoption and use of LOST disproportionately benefits counties with higher source revenue capacity, those that were wealthier, and those that allocated more for school capital outlays despite lower level of tax efforts. Second, most counties with less LOST proceeds appear to receive slightly higher amounts of total state aid per pupil. Interestingly, the pattern of distribution was different for two state aid funds.
Counties with less LOST proceeds actually got less from School Building Capital Fund, probably because the Fund requires 1/3 matching of local funds, for which earmarked LOST proceeds may be used. xv In contrast, counties with less LOST proceeds received more support from School Building Bond Fund, because the Fund distributes 35 percent of its revenues negatively related to counties' ability-to-pay, which is ranked in line with both property tax base and the amount of LOST proceeds.
LOST and School Capital Revenue Inequalities
In Table 5 , we present Gini indices for total school capital revenue as well as the impact of various revenue sources on capital revenue disparities during 2004-2006. xvi Following the methods discussed in the previous section, we decompose the Gini index to show the contribution of multiple revenue sources-in particular, restricted and unrestricted LOST proceeds-to the dispersion of total school capital revenue. property tax base) tends to drive up disparity in education finance. In addition, the ratio of 1.38 for new debt proceeds (a nine-year average amount) indicates that this particular revenue source is over-dispersed than the total revenue. This can be in part explained by the fact that debt issuance is infrequent and disparate. In fact, nineteen counties did not issue debt for school infrastructure during 1998-2006, while the twenty-five counties with the highest levels of school capital revenues on average issued over $600 per pupil annually, which accounted for over half of their total school capital revenue (see Table   3 ). 
In contrast, a positive and smaller-than-1 Pseudo-Ratio indicates that a revenue source is less widely dispersed along the rank of the total revenue and thus is modifying the overall inequality; a negative Pseudo-Ratio will mean that a revenue source is negatively dispersed along the rank of the total revenue and, thus, has a strong equalization effect. With the Pseudo-Ratio, we may distinguish two kinds of equalization effects: a strong equalization effect ("offsetting") indicated by a negative Pseudo-Ratio, and a weak equalization effect ("pooling") indicated by a positive yet smaller-than-1
Pseudo-Ratio (Zhao, 2009 ). The ratio of 0.62 for total state aid in 2006, for instance, signifies the "pooling" equalization effect of the revenue source. We do not see any "offsetting" equalization effect of various revenue sources over the period of 2004-2006. Regarding the focus of this study-the effects of LOST proceeds-we find that the ratio is around 0.01-0.03 for restricted LOST proceeds, and 1.54-1.58 for unrestricted LOST proceeds. This means that the restricted LOST proceeds have a "pooling" equalization effect, but the unrestricted LOST proceeds serve to increase the dispersion of total school capital revenue.
The second panel in the table shows the relative contribution of each revenue source to the Gini index. The contribution is determined not only by Pseudo-Ratios but also by the shares of revenue sources in total revenue. As two dominating driving forces of the inequality, debt proceeds and county general support together accounted for about 98 percent of the dispersion. For debt proceeds, the contributions were about 60 percent in the three-year period; for count general support, around 36-39 percent. The restricted LOST proceeds show only marginal contribution to the overall dispersion, although the "*! ! source accounted for a fairly large portion of total school capital revenue (see Table 2 ).
Unrestricted LOST proceeds and total state aid both have low contributions to the inequality of total school capital revenue.
The third panel in Table 5 
Equity Effect in Alternative Scenarios of LOST Earmarking and Allocation
In the final step, we analyze the potential equity effect if the LOST proceeds were earmarked or allocated in alternative ways. Table 6 Finally, when the two LOST are fully earmarked, the allocation of LOST proceeds (based on county population or numbers of students) makes little difference in revenue equalization. However, as the LOST proceeds become a larger share of school capital revenues, per capita allocation may introduce a new dimension of revenue disparity, when counties with a higher population are not necessarily those with more students.
CONCLUSION
This study investigates the distribution of public school capital revenues across counties and the relative contribution of various revenue sources to the dispersion of total This article has several implications concerning the issue of funding disparity for school capital needs, which is worth our special attention in future research. First, in most states, state funding tends to play an important role for improving the equity of education, but the actual impacts vary depending on how the funds are allocated. Given the increasing pressure for states to increase funding for school facilities, it is important to investigate and understand the impact of state capital aid programs with different forms of design.
Second, disparities in education capital funding are more complex than those in education operating expenditures, because both capital revenues and expenditures are less regular or stable. For instance, schools heavily rely on municipal bonds issued only once in several years and use the proceeds raised from the issuance in a period of multiple years. Some schools may spend a high percentage of annual capital outlays on debt services for obligations incurred long before, instead of on current improvements.
Consequently, analysis of disparities in school capital outlays on a cross-sectional basis is, by nature, flawed. In this project, we averaged newly issued municipal debt over a nine-year period to measure the level of debt usage, and used other revenues in a threeyear period to assess the trend of capital funding. In future research, we may develop a #%! ! more comprehensive approach to better account for the longitudinal dimension of capital revenues and expenditures, and the intricacy between debt and regular ongoing revenues.
Third, it is worth noting that NC is a special case for the study of school finance.
As one of few states in which all school districts are fiscally dependent, NC schools not only receive state grants, but are also dependent on county general fund allocations. This feature makes it a unique case in which to study the equalization effects of LOST proceeds because part of the proceeds is restricted for school capital outlays, but the rest is not. Schools have to compete for unrestricted county general fund allocations against other service needs. On one hand, the study of the unique case of NC may improve our understanding of issues concerning funding for school facilities in fiscally dependent school districts. On the other hand, it will be necessary to conduct further research on independent school districts, to seek additional insights on funding for school facilities in other states.
Lastly, the study shows that the equalizing effect of a revenue source should be examined together with other revenue sources. Previous studies in the area of local fiscal disparity often examined whether a revenue source had an equalization (or disequalization) effect by comparing its distribution to that of other revenues, or by comparing some inequality measures before and after the addition of one other revenue source. Methods of inequality decomposition, such as the standard decomposition of Gini index used in this analysis, move one step further to estimate partial equalization effects for each revenue source. These methods can be more widely used because they may have significant policy implications.
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APPENDIX: DECOMPOSITION OF THE GINI INDEX
According to Fei, Ranis, and Kuo (1978) , the Gini index of revenue can be decomposed by the sources of revenue that make up the total revenue. Let denote the revenue of individual county i (i = 1,…, n) from source k (k = 1,…, K), then the Gini index of total revenue, G(Y), can be transformed to (1) where is the mean of , is the mean of , and (2) is known as the pseudo-Gini for source k. It is not the conventional Gini value G(Y k ), since the weights attached to correspond to the rank of individual county i in the distribution of which, in general, is not the same as its rank in the distribution of . In addition, we can define the absolute and relative contribution of revenue source k to total revenue inequality as S k (G) and s k (G), respectively.
and (4) Equivalently, Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) show that we can also estimate the effect of a small change !in a specific revenue source k on inequality of total revenue, holding revenue from all other sources constant (See Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985, p.153) . !For example, in Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 357 (1997) , the court explained: "Plaintiffs complain of inadequate school facilities…They allege that their poor districts' media centers have sparse and outdated book collections and lack the technology present in the wealthier school districts."! -!Like Brunner and Rueben (2001) and many other literature in state and local finance, in this analysis we assume that higher property values are associated with higher tax capacity for local governments. Note that, at the individual level, property tax base is not necessarily connected to the ability to pay, because taste for housing can be idiosyncratic. Some low to middle income families might be attracted to "better" schools (with higher per pupil capital revenues) and be willing to pay a higher percentage of their incomes for housing.
-, !Surprisingly, he finds that the condition of school facilities improves modestly as the share of African American students goes up.! -,, !One major difference between the two approaches is whether or not they account for the possibility of a local government to export tax burdens to nonresidents of the jurisdiction.! -,,, !All financial data used for this analysis are adjusted for inflation. ,. !There are many different ways to measure inequality in the context of school capital financing. The Gini index is used frequently because it is closely related to the Lorenz curve of an income distribution and has a simple geometric interpretation, but it has some disadvantages too, such as its relative insensitivity to transfers for non-middle income classes (Elteto and Frigyes, 1968) . For example, a variety of distribution of the measure of income (or revenue capacity) can yield the same Gini (Schutz, 1951) . Nevertheless, other inequality measures have their disadvantages too as they attach different weight to transfers at different income levels (Atkinson, 1969) . We shall also note that, in this analysis, the inequality is assessed at the county level in terms of local fiscal capacity. It is not necessarily connected with individual's ability to pay (see endnote v). . !The distribution of capital revenue appears to be similar in 2004-2006.! ., !We used other revenues in a three-year period rather than a nine-year period because of the change in state aid programs. We could not obtain the revenue data for the Critical School Facility Needs Fund before the merger of the fund into the Public School Building Capital Fund in 2004.! .,, !Property tax, unrestricted LOST, and other revenues in county general support for school capital outlays are estimated based on the share of these revenue sources in total county general revenue. Some counties also have a special property tax levy to pay back general obligation municipal bonds. The data are not included in the county general support.! .,,, !The use of restricted LOST proceeds to partly cover debt service payments can help preserve counties' debt capacity to be supported by their property tax base.! .,-!Families in poverty refer to families whose 1999 income falls below the poverty threshold appropriate to that family in the Census 2000 record. For the definition and methodology, please see http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/methods/schools/data/2005.html.! .-!Another criterion for the School Building Capital Fund's allocation is student enrollment, but we do not observe any significant pattern of enrollment or enrollment growth across county quartiles in Table 4 .! .-,! The use of Gini index to measure revenue inequality in this article does not control for factors that may affect school capital needs such as student enrollment growth. Thus we report our findings as "capital revenue disparities" instead of "capital fiscal disparities," which ideally should be measured based on the need-capacity gap of school districts in providing facilities.
.-,, !To include both debt proceeds and LOST revenues may be double-counting to some extent, because part of the LOST revenues is used to repay the debt. Ideally, we should subtract the proceeds of municipal debts that are paid back by earmarked LOST revenues, but the data are not available. !
